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DTSTART:20161030T020000
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DTSTART:20170324T020000
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UID:calendar.52380.field_date.0@mathematics.huji.ac.il
DTSTAMP:20191116T232220Z
CREATED:20180207T152328Z
DESCRIPTION:Date: \n\n4:00pm to 5:00pm\n\n\n\n\nSee also: Game Theory & M
athematical Economics\, Events & Seminars\, SeminarsLocation: \n\nElath Ha
ll\, 2nd floor\, Feldman Building\, Edmond J. Safra Campus\n\n\nRisks rela
ted to events that arrive randomly play important role in many real life d
ecisions\, and models of learning and experimentation based on two-armed P
oisson bandits addressed several important aspects related to strategic an
d motivational learning in cases when events arrive at jumps times of the
standard Poisson process. At the same time\, these models remain mostly ab
stract theoretical models with few direct economic applications. We sugges
t a new class of models of strategic experimentation which are almost as t
ractable as exponential models\, but incorporate such realistic features a
s dependence of the expected rate of news arrival on the time elapsed sinc
e the start of an experiment and judgement about the quality of a \risky'
arm based on evidence of a series of trials as opposed to a single evidenc
e of success or failure as in exponential models with conclusive experimen
ts. We demonstrate that\, unlike in the exponential models\, players may s
top experimentation before the first breakdown happens. Moreover\, ceteris
paribus\, experimentation in a model with breakthroughs may last longer t
han experimentation in the corresponding model with breakdowns.\n\n Expor
t\n \n\n \nsubscribe iCal
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20170319T160000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20170319T170000
LAST-MODIFIED:20180207T152328Z
SUMMARY:Game Theory & Math Economics: Svetlana Boyarchenko (University of T
exas) - 'Strategic Experimentation with Erlang Bandits'
URL;TYPE=URI:https://mathematics.huji.ac.il/event/game-theory-math-economic
s-svetlana-boyarchenko-university-texas-strategic
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