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DTSTART:20171029T020000
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UID:calendar.55809.field_date.0@mathematics.huji.ac.il
DTSTAMP:20190615T204533Z
CREATED:20180424T090004Z
DESCRIPTION:Date: \n\n1:30pm to 2:30pm\n\n\n\n\nSee also: Game Theory & M
athematical Economics\, Events & Seminars\, SeminarsLocation: \n\nElath Ha
ll\, 2nd floor\, Feldman Building\, Edmond Safra Campus\n\n\n\n\nAbstract
:\n\nWe consider a setting where an auctioneer sells a single item to n po
tential agents with {\em interdependent values}. That is\, each agent has
her own private signal\, and the valuation of each agent is a function of
all n private signals. This captures settings such as valuations for oil f
ields\, broadcast rights\, art\, etc.\n\nIn the interdependent value setti
ng\, all previous work has assumed a so-called *single-crossing condition*
. Single-crossing essentially means that one's own private signal has a gr
eater effect on her valuation than on anyone else's valuation. Without sin
gle-crossing\, one cannot maximize social welfare. We show that without si
ngle-crossing\, effectively\, the best one can do is to assign the item to
a random bidder.\n\nTo the best of our knowledge\, this is the first pape
r that deals with approximating social welfare without the single-crossing
condition. We consider a relaxed version of single-crossing\, c-single-cr
ossing\, with some parameter c (c=1 is single-crossing)\, and obtain many
positive results.\n\nThese include a prior-free universally truthful \sqrt
{n}c^{1.5}-approximation to welfare\, and a prior-free deterministic (n-1)
c-approximation to welfare. Under appropriate concavity conditions\, we im
prove this to a prior-free universally truthful O(c)-approximation to welf
are as well as a prior-free universally truthful O(c^2)-approximation to t
he optimal revenue.\n\nJoint work with Alon Eden\, Amos Fiat and Kira Gold
ner.\n\n Export\n \n\n \nsubscribe iCal
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20180429T133000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Jerusalem:20180429T143000
LAST-MODIFIED:20180424T090004Z
SUMMARY:GAME THEORY AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH SEMINAR:Michal Feld
man\, Tel Aviv University 'Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing (
Joint work with Alon Eden\, Amos Fiat and Kira Goldner)'
URL;TYPE=URI:https://mathematics.huji.ac.il/event/game-theory-and-mathemati
cal-economics-research-seminarmichal-feldman-tel-aviv
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