Topic: Limits of Correlation with Bounded Complexity
Abstract:
Peretz (2013) showed that, perhaps surprisingly, players whose recall is bounded can correlate in a long repeated game against a player of greater recall capacity. We show that correlation is already impossible against an opponent whose recall capacity is only linearly larger. This result closes a gap in the characterisation of min-max levels, and hence also equilibrium payoffs, of repeated games with bounded recall.
This paper characterizes the ordinal utilities over the bounded infinite streams of payoffs that satisfy the time-value of money principle and an additivity property, and those that in addition are impatient. Building on this characterization, the paper introduces the concept of optimization that is robust to small imprecision in the specification of the preference, and proves that the set of feasible streams of payoffs of a finite Markov Decision Process admits such a robust optimization.
A sound legal infrastructure is critical to the development of the Israeli economy. In its absence, business people and private persons alike face difficulties in planning their actions. All too often they are obliged to turn to the courts of law. However, in the absence of a proper infrastructure, those do not themselves have the necessary tools to resolve the disputes. The matters at issue are not marginal. They have long-lasting consequences for the economy. The number of publicly-traded companies listed in Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange sank from 657 in 2008 to 461 in March 2016.
Topic: Calibrated Forecasts, Leaks, and Game Equilibria (joint work with Dean P. Foster)
Place: Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Time: Sunday, November 22, 2015 at 4:00 p.m.
Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m.
YOU ARE CORDIALLY INVITED
Topic: Has the National Health Insurance Law Run its Course?
Place: Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Time: Sunday, June 19, 2016 at 4:00 p.m.
Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m.
YOU ARE CORDIALLY INVITED
Abstract:
The National Health Insurance Law is operated through several economic mechanisms that are meant to implement its vision.
In this lecture we will present the main flaws of some of these mechanisms and propose ways to fix them. The lecture will be in hebrew.
Speaker: Liad Blumrosen, HUJI
Topic: (Almost) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading (joint work with Shahar Dobzinski)
Place: Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Time: Sunday, November 15, 2015 at 4:00 p.m.
Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m.
YOU ARE CORDIALLY INVITED
On the "Limited Feedback" Foundation of Boundedly Rational Expectations
De ninguna manera, una vez que la patente de cierto medicamento expira, cualquier otra compañía puede fabricar formas genéricas del comprar viagra comprar viagra mismo medicamento.
Location:
Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
Dates:
Sunday, November 29, 2015 - 16:00
Lecturers:
Ran Spiegler
Tel Aviv University and University College London
Abstract:
Topic: "Rule Rationality" (Joint work with Yuval Heller)
Abstract:
We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one’s opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments.
Higher Etale obstructions are cohomological obstructions introduced by Yonatan Harpaz and Tomer Schlank for solutions of algebraic equations over a field. Their definition is based on the theory of relative etale homotopy type. In my talk I will explain the construction of relative etale homotopy type and the resulting obstruction theory.
I will also present the calculation of these obstructions for quadratic equations of the form a_1x_1^2 + ... + a_nx_n^2 = 1. This is a joint work with Edo Arad and Tomer Schlank.
