2016
Mar
20

# Game theory & economics: Gilad Bavly and Ron Peretz, (Bar-Ilan)

3:30pm to 4:30pm

## Location:

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus

Topic: Limits of Correlation with Bounded Complexity

Abstract:

Peretz (2013) showed that, perhaps surprisingly, players whose recall is bounded can correlate in a long repeated game against a player of greater recall capacity. We show that correlation is already impossible against an opponent whose recall capacity is only linearly larger. This result closes a gap in the characterisation of min-max levels, and hence also equilibrium payoffs, of repeated games with bounded recall.

Abstract:

Peretz (2013) showed that, perhaps surprisingly, players whose recall is bounded can correlate in a long repeated game against a player of greater recall capacity. We show that correlation is already impossible against an opponent whose recall capacity is only linearly larger. This result closes a gap in the characterisation of min-max levels, and hence also equilibrium payoffs, of repeated games with bounded recall.