Colloquium: Ron Peretz (Bar Ilan) - "Repeated Games with Bounded Memory - the Entropy Method"

In the past two decades the entropy method has been successfully employed in the study of repeated games. I will present a few results that demonstrate the relations between entropy and memory. More specifically: a finite game is repeated (finitely or infinitely) many times. Each player i is restricted to strategies that can recall only the last k_i stages of history. The goal is to characterize the (asymptotic) set of equilibrium payoffs. Such a characterization is available for two-player games, but not for three players or more. Related papers: R. Peretz (2012). The Strategic Value of Recall, Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 332-351. R. Peretz (2013). Correlation through Bounded Recall Strategies, International Journal of Game Theory 42 (4), 867-890. G. Bavly and R. Peretz (submitted) Towards a theory of repeated games with bounded recall

Date: 

Thu, 12/04/2018 - 14:30 to 15:30

Location: 

Manchester Building (Hall 2), Hebrew University Jerusalem