Abstract:

In the past two decades the entropy method has been successfully employed in the study of repeated games. I will present a few results that demonstrate the relations between entropy and memory. More specifically: a finite game is repeated (finitely or infinitely) many times. Each player $i$ is restricted to strategies that can recall only the last $k_i$ stages of history. The goal is to characterize the (asymptotic) set of equilibrium payoffs. Such a characterization is available for two-player games, but not for three players or more.

Related papers:

R. Peretz (2012). The Strategic Value of Recall, Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 332-351.

R. Peretz (2013). Correlation through Bounded Recall Strategies, International Journal of Game Theory 42 (4), 867-890.

G. Bavly and R. Peretz (submitted) Towards a theory of repeated games with bounded recall

In the past two decades the entropy method has been successfully employed in the study of repeated games. I will present a few results that demonstrate the relations between entropy and memory. More specifically: a finite game is repeated (finitely or infinitely) many times. Each player $i$ is restricted to strategies that can recall only the last $k_i$ stages of history. The goal is to characterize the (asymptotic) set of equilibrium payoffs. Such a characterization is available for two-player games, but not for three players or more.

Related papers:

R. Peretz (2012). The Strategic Value of Recall, Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 332-351.

R. Peretz (2013). Correlation through Bounded Recall Strategies, International Journal of Game Theory 42 (4), 867-890.

G. Bavly and R. Peretz (submitted) Towards a theory of repeated games with bounded recall

## Date:

Thu, 12/04/2018 - 14:30 to 15:30

## Location:

Manchester Building (Hall 2), Hebrew University Jerusalem