Game Theory & Math Economics: Liad Blumrosen (HUJI) - "(Almost) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading" (joint work with Shahar Dobzinski)

We study the simplest form of two-sided markets: one seller, one buyer and a single item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We characterize the quality of the most efficient mechanisms that are budget balanced, and design simple and robust mechanisms with these properties. We also show how minimal use of statistical data can yield good results. Finally, we demonstrate how solutions for this simple bilateral-trade problem can be used as a "black-box" for constructing mechanisms in more general environments. (Joint with Shahar Dobzinski)


Sun, 15/11/2015 - 15:30 to 16:30


Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus