Date:
Sun, 29/05/201616:00-17:00
Location:
Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m.
YOU ARE CORDIALLY INVITED
Abstract:
I will present a new solution concept for multiplayer stochastic games, namely, acceptable strategy profiles. For each player $i$ and state $s$ in a stochastic game, let $w_i(s)$ be a real number. A strategy profile is \emph{$w$-acceptable}, where $w=(w_i(s))$, if the discounted payoff to each player $i$ is at least $w_i(s)$ when the initial state is $s$, provided the discount factor of the players is sufficiently close to 1. Our goal is to provide simple strategy profiles that are $w$-acceptable for payoff vectors $w$ in which all coordinates are high.
YOU ARE CORDIALLY INVITED
Abstract:
I will present a new solution concept for multiplayer stochastic games, namely, acceptable strategy profiles. For each player $i$ and state $s$ in a stochastic game, let $w_i(s)$ be a real number. A strategy profile is \emph{$w$-acceptable}, where $w=(w_i(s))$, if the discounted payoff to each player $i$ is at least $w_i(s)$ when the initial state is $s$, provided the discount factor of the players is sufficiently close to 1. Our goal is to provide simple strategy profiles that are $w$-acceptable for payoff vectors $w$ in which all coordinates are high.