# Game Theory & Mathematical Economics

# Game theory seminar: Computational Design Principles of Cognition (Yuval Hart)

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# Game theory seminar: Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting (Benny Moldovanu)

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have preferences induced by general norms. We uncover the deep connections between dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DIC) on the one hand,

and several geometric/functional analytic concepts on the other. Our main results are:

1) Marginal medians are DIC if and only if they are calculated

with respect to coordinates defined by a basis such that the norm is orthant-monotonic in the associated coordinate system.

# Game Theory Seminar: Naftali Tishby "Information Theory of Deep Learning"

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In the past several years we have developed a comprehensive theory of large scale learning with Deep Neural Networks (DNN), when optimized with Stochastic Gradient Decent (SGD). Read more about Game Theory Seminar: Naftali Tishby "Information Theory of Deep Learning"

# GT&ME: Olga Gorelkina (University of Liverpool Management School) - "Collusion via Information Sharing and Optimal Auctions"

This paper studies collusion via information sharing in the context of auctions. The model of collusion via

# GT & ME: Rida Laraki (CNRS, Liverpool) - "Majority judgment: a new voting method" (joint with Michel Balinski)

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# GAME THEORY AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH SEMINAR:Michal Feldman, Tel Aviv University "Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing (Joint work with Alon Eden, Amos Fiat and Kira Goldner)"

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Abstract:

We consider a setting where an auctioneer sells a single item to n potential agents with {\em interdependent values}. That is, each agent has her own private signal, and the valuation of each agent is a function of all n private signals. This captures settings such as valuations for oil fields, broadcast rights, art, etc. Read more about GAME THEORY AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH SEMINAR:Michal Feldman, Tel Aviv University "Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing (Joint work with Alon Eden, Amos Fiat and Kira Goldner)"

# Game theory: Jeffrey Mensch, HUJI "Cardinal Representations of Information"

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# Game Theory & Math Economics: Sergiu Hart - "Too Much Two Good To Be True: The Complexity of Auctions"

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We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods (or items). In this talk we will focus on approximation results and on the "menu-size" as a measure of auction complexity which affects the revenue. * All the relevant concepts will be introduced in the talk.* The talk is mostly independent of the talk given earlier this year.

# Game Theory & Math Economics: Philip J. Reny (University of Chicago) - "Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions," (joint work with Roger Myerson)

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Guided by several key examples, we formulate a definition of essential sequential equilibrium for multi-stage games with infinite type sets and infinite action sets, and we prove its general existence.

# Game Theory & Math Economics: Fuad Aleskerov (National Research University "Higher School of Economics" and Institute of Control Sciences, Moscow) - "Power Distribution: Theory and Applications"

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# Game Theory & Math Economics: Sergui Hart - "Much Too Good To Be True: Lotteries and the Complexity of Auctions"

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We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single buyer. In this talk we will focus on the need for randomization (which arises only when there are multiple goods), and on the "menu-size" as a measure of auction complexity which affects the revenue. (All the relevant concepts will be introduced in the talk.) Read more about Game Theory & Math Economics: Sergui Hart - "Much Too Good To Be True: Lotteries and the Complexity of Auctions"