The Game theory and mathematical economics research seminar takes place on Sundays at 16:00 at Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus. One can also find the schedule here.
Driven by recent technological advancements, behavior and brain activity can now be measured at an unprecedented resolution and scale. This “big-data” revolution is akin to a similar revolution in biology. In biology, the wealth of data allowed systems-biologists to uncover the underlying design principles that are shared among biological systems. In my studies, I apply design principles from systems-biology to cognitive phenomena. In my talk I will demonstrate this approach in regard to creative search.
We study issue-by-issue voting and robust mechanism design in multidimensional frameworks where privately informed agents
have preferences induced by general norms. We uncover the deep connections between dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DIC) on the one hand,
and several geometric/functional analytic concepts on the other. Our main results are:
1) Marginal medians are DIC if and only if they are calculated
with respect to coordinates defined by a basis such that the norm is orthant-monotonic in the associated coordinate system.
Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods (or items). In this talk we will focus on approximation results and on the "menu-size" as a measure of auction complexity which affects the revenue. * All the relevant concepts will be introduced in the talk.* The talk is mostly independent of the talk given earlier this year.
Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
Guided by several key examples, we formulate a definition of essential sequential equilibrium for multi-stage games with infinite type sets and infinite action sets, and we prove its general existence.
Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
We discuss a new class of indices taking into account agents'preferences to coalesce.An axiomatization of these indices are presented.These indices are used to evaluate power distribution in Russian parliament in new era and in Empire period, in the Reichstag of Weimar Republic, in IMF, in Russian banks.
