Game Theory & Mathematical Economics

The Game theory and mathematical economics research seminar takes place on Sundays at 16:00 at Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus. One can also find the schedule here.
2018 Apr 29

GAME THEORY AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH SEMINAR:Michal Feldman, Tel Aviv University "Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing (Joint work with Alon Eden, Amos Fiat and Kira Goldner)"

1:30pm to 2:30pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus

Abstract:

We consider a setting where an auctioneer sells a single item to n potential agents with {\em interdependent values}. That is, each agent has her own private signal, and the valuation of each agent is a function of all n private signals. This captures settings such as valuations for oil fields, broadcast rights, art, etc.

2012 Nov 25

Game Theory & Math Economics: Sergiu Hart - "Too Much Two Good To Be True: The Complexity of Auctions"

4:00pm to 6:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods (or items). In this talk we will focus on approximation results and on the "menu-size" as a measure of auction complexity which affects the revenue. * All the relevant concepts will be introduced in the talk.* The talk is mostly independent of the talk given earlier this year.

Paper 1
Paper 2

2012 Nov 11

Game Theory & Math Economics: Philip J. Reny (University of Chicago) - "Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions," (joint work with Roger Myerson)

4:00pm to 6:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

Guided by several key examples, we formulate a definition of essential sequential equilibrium for multi-stage games with infinite type sets and infinite action sets, and we prove its general existence.

Paper

2012 Nov 04

Game Theory & Math Economics: Fuad Aleskerov (National Research University "Higher School of Economics" and Institute of Control Sciences, Moscow) - "Power Distribution: Theory and Applications"

4:00pm to 6:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
We discuss a new class of indices taking into account agents'preferences to coalesce.An axiomatization of these indices are presented.These indices are used to evaluate power distribution in Russian parliament in new era and in Empire period, in the Reichstag of Weimar Republic, in IMF, in Russian banks.
2012 Oct 28

Game Theory & Math Economics: Sergui Hart - "Much Too Good To Be True: Lotteries and the Complexity of Auctions"

4:00pm to 6:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single buyer. In this talk we will focus on the need for randomization (which arises only when there are multiple goods), and on the "menu-size" as a measure of auction complexity which affects the revenue. (All the relevant concepts will be introduced in the talk.)

2016 Feb 28

Game theory & economics: Itzhak Gilboa (Tel Aviv, HEC Paris)

3:30pm to 4:30pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Topic: Weighted Utilitarianism, Edgeworth, and the Market (joint work with Rossella Argenziano) Place: Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus Time: Sunday, March 6, 2016 at 4:00 p.m. Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m. YOU ARE CORDIALLY INVITED
2015 Jan 11

Game Theory & Math Economics: Gaëtan FOURNIER (Paris-Sorbonne University) - "Efficiency of Equilibria in Hotelling Games" (joint with Marco Scarsini)

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
We consider a Hotelling game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential customers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location. We show that when the number of retailers is large enough, the game admits a pure Nash equilibrium and we construct it. We then compare the equilibrium cost bore by the consumers with the cost that could be achieved if the retailers followed the dictate of a benevolent planner. We look at this efficiency of equilibrium asymptotically in the number of retailers.
2015 Jan 18

Game Theory & Math Economics: Itai Arieli (Technion) - "Social Learning and the Vanishing Value of Private Information"

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

This paper considers a sequential social learning game with a general utility function, state and action space. We establish that the value of private information converges to zero almost surely in every Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of any sequential social learning game.We use this result to show that totally unbounded signals are necessary and sufficient for asymptotic learning to hold in every sequential social learning game. Finally, we assume that the utility function of each agent is a private random draw and establish robustness of our results. (Joint with M. Mueller-Frank).

Pages