# GT&ME: Olga Gorelkina (University of Liverpool Management School) - "Collusion via Information Sharing and Optimal Auctions"

This paper studies collusion via information sharing in the context of auctions. The model of collusion via

The Game theory and mathematical economics research seminar takes place on Sundays at 16:00 at Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus. One can also find the schedule here.

2019
Jan
06

2:00pm to 3:30pm

Refreshments available at 1:30.

This paper studies collusion via information sharing in the context of auctions. The model of collusion via

This paper studies collusion via information sharing in the context of auctions. The model of collusion via

2018
Dec
30

2:00pm to 3:30pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus

Refreshments available at 1:30 p.m.

2018
Apr
29

1:30pm to 2:30pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus

Abstract:

We consider a setting where an auctioneer sells a single item to n potential agents with {\em interdependent values}. That is, each agent has her own private signal, and the valuation of each agent is a function of all n private signals. This captures settings such as valuations for oil fields, broadcast rights, art, etc. Read more about GAME THEORY AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH SEMINAR:Michal Feldman, Tel Aviv University "Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing (Joint work with Alon Eden, Amos Fiat and Kira Goldner)"

2018
Apr
15

2018
Mar
25

2:00pm to 3:00pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus

2012
Nov
25

4:00pm to 6:00pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods (or items). In this talk we will focus on approximation results and on the "menu-size" as a measure of auction complexity which affects the revenue. * All the relevant concepts will be introduced in the talk.* The talk is mostly independent of the talk given earlier this year.

2012
Nov
11

4:00pm to 6:00pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

Guided by several key examples, we formulate a definition of essential sequential equilibrium for multi-stage games with infinite type sets and infinite action sets, and we prove its general existence.

2012
Nov
04

4:00pm to 6:00pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

We discuss a new class of indices taking into account agents'preferences to coalesce.An axiomatization of these indices are presented.These indices are used to evaluate power distribution in Russian parliament in new era and in Empire period, in the Reichstag of Weimar Republic, in IMF, in Russian banks.

2012
Oct
28

4:00pm to 6:00pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single buyer. In this talk we will focus on the need for randomization (which arises only when there are multiple goods), and on the "menu-size" as a measure of auction complexity which affects the revenue. (All the relevant concepts will be introduced in the talk.) Read more about Game Theory & Math Economics: Sergui Hart - "Much Too Good To Be True: Lotteries and the Complexity of Auctions"

2016
Jan
03

3:30pm to 4:30pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus

Topic: Dynamic assignment of objects to queuing agents
Abstract:

2016
Feb
28

3:30pm to 4:30pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus

Topic: Weighted Utilitarianism, Edgeworth, and the Market (joint work with Rossella Argenziano)
Place: Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Time: Sunday, March 6, 2016 at 4:00 p.m.
Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m.
YOU ARE CORDIALLY INVITED

2015
Jan
04

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

2015
Jan
11

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

We consider a Hotelling game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential customers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location. We show that when the number of retailers is large enough, the game admits a pure Nash equilibrium and we construct it. We then compare the equilibrium cost bore by the consumers with the cost that could be achieved if the retailers followed the dictate of a benevolent planner. We look at this efficiency of equilibrium asymptotically in the number of retailers.

2015
Jan
18

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

This paper considers a sequential social learning game with a general utility function, state and action space. We establish that the value of private information converges to zero almost surely in every Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of any sequential social learning game.We use this result to show that totally unbounded signals are necessary and sufficient for asymptotic learning to hold in every sequential social learning game. Finally, we assume that the utility function of each agent is a private random draw and establish robustness of our results. (Joint with M. Mueller-Frank). Read more about Game Theory & Math Economics: Itai Arieli (Technion) - "Social Learning and the Vanishing Value of Private Information"

2015
Jan
25

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

We show that feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) can be used to select k from m alternatives. An important advantage of this method is the core property: no coalition can guarantee an outcome that is preferred by all its members.