2017
Jan
29

# Game Theory & Math Economics: Yakov Babichenko (Technion) - "Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria" (joint work with Aviad Rubinstein)

4:00pm to 5:00pm

## Location:

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

For a constant ε>0, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ε-Nash equilibrium in two-player N×N games.For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ε,ε)-weak approximateNash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1-ε)-fraction of the players are ε-best replying.