Seminars

2015 Nov 29

Game Theory & Math Economics: Ran Spiegler (Tel Aviv University and University College London) - "On the "Limited Feedback" Foundation of Boundedly Rational Expectations"

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
A common justification for boundedly rational expectations is that agents receive partial feedback about the equilibrium distribution. I formalize this idea in the context of the "Bayesian network" representation of boundedly rational expectations, presented in Spiegler (2015). According to this representation, the decision maker forms his beliefs as if he Öts a subjective causal model - captured by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) over the set of variables - to the objective distribution.
2015 Dec 27

Game Theory & Math Economics: Eyal Winter (HUJI) - "Rule Rationality" (Joint work with Yuval Heller)

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one’s opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing first). Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m.
2016 Mar 20

Game Theory & Math Economics: Gilad Bavly and Ron Peretz (Bar-Ilan) - "Limits of Correlation with Bounded Complexity"

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Peretz (2013) showed that, perhaps surprisingly, players whose recall is bounded can correlate in a long repeated game against a player of greater recall capacity. We show that correlation is already impossible against an opponent whose recall capacity is only linearly larger. This result closes a gap in the characterisation of min-max levels, and hence also equilibrium payoffs, of repeated games with bounded recall.
2018 Jan 29

HD-Combinatorics Special day: Pseudo-randomness (organised by Uli Wagner)

10:00am to 5:00pm

Location: 

IIAS, Feldman Building, Givat Ram
10:00-11:00     Anna Gundert Uli Wagner - Quasirandomness and expansion for graphs

11:30-12:30     Anna Gundert Uli Wagner - Quasirandomness for hypergraphs

13:45- 14:45    Uli Wagner - Szemeredi's regularity lemma for dense graphs

15:00-16:00     Tamar Ziegler - Gowers uniformity norms

16:30-17:30     Anna Gundert Uli Wagner - Hypergraph regularity 
2017 Dec 10

Game Theory & Math Economics: Sergiu Hart (HUJI)

4:00pm to 4:30pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
A unified integral approach to all the calibration results in the literature -- from regular probabilistic calibration to smooth deterministic calibration -- using simple "hairy" fixed point and minimax results.
2018 Jan 14

Game Theory & Math Economics: Harry Dankowicz (UIUC) "Emergent Task Differentiation on Network Filters"

4:00pm to 4:30pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
Inspired by empirical observations on honey bee colonies, we analyze the emergence of task differentiation in a model complex system, characterized by an absence of hierarchical control, yet able to exhibit coordinated behavior and collective function. The analysis considers the steady-state response of a mechanical interaction network to exogenous resonant excitation.
2017 Dec 24

Game Theory & Math Economics: Yonatan Aumann (Bar - Ilan) - "On Time Discounting, Impatience and Risk Aversion"

4:00pm to 4:30pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
Time discounting is a ubiquitous assumption in economic literature. We (re)explore the foundations of such time preferences. "Impatience" is defined as a preferences for experiencing the better states sooner rather than later, even when there is no uncertainty associated with the future. We show that, assuming consistency and some weak stationarity assumptions, impatience is incompatible with a meaningful notion of a risk-attitude (risk aversion/love/neutrality).On the other hand, if there is uncertainty associated with the future then discounting necessarily emerges.

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