Events & Seminars

2016 Jan 10

Game Theory & Math Economics: Francis Bloch (Paris School of Economics) - "Dynamic assignment of objects to queuing agents"

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of objects which arrive sequentially to agents organized in a waiting list. Applications include the assignment of social housing and organs for transplants. We analyze the optimal design of probabilistic queuing disciplines, punishment schemes, the optimal timing of applications and information releases. We consider three efficiency criteria: the vector of values of agents in the queue, the probability of misallocation and the expected waste.
2016 May 08

Game Theory & Math Economics: Matthew Elliott (Caltech) - "Endogenous Financial Networks: Efficient Modularity and Why Shareholders Prevent It" (joint work with Jonathon Hazell)

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Topic: Endogenous Financial Networks: Efficient Modularity and Why Shareholders Prevent It (joint work with Jonathon Hazell) We consider systemic risk in financial networks, by examining the conflict of interest between debt- and equity-holders. Through trading, banks can diversify their idiosyncratic risks and avoid failures following small shocks. However, the resulting interdependencies can cause multiple failures after large shocks.
2015 Nov 15

Game Theory & Math Economics: Liad Blumrosen (HUJI) - "(Almost) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading" (joint work with Shahar Dobzinski)

3:30pm to 4:30pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
We study the simplest form of two-sided markets: one seller, one buyer and a single item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We characterize the quality of the most efficient mechanisms that are budget balanced, and design simple and robust mechanisms with these properties. We also show how minimal use of statistical data can yield good results. Finally, we demonstrate how solutions for this simple bilateral-trade problem can be used as a "black-box" for constructing mechanisms in more general environments.
2015 Nov 29

Game Theory & Math Economics: Ran Spiegler (Tel Aviv University and University College London) - "On the "Limited Feedback" Foundation of Boundedly Rational Expectations"

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
A common justification for boundedly rational expectations is that agents receive partial feedback about the equilibrium distribution. I formalize this idea in the context of the "Bayesian network" representation of boundedly rational expectations, presented in Spiegler (2015). According to this representation, the decision maker forms his beliefs as if he Öts a subjective causal model - captured by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) over the set of variables - to the objective distribution.
2018 Jan 29

HD-Combinatorics Special day: Pseudo-randomness (organised by Uli Wagner)

10:00am to 5:00pm

Location: 

IIAS, Feldman Building, Givat Ram
10:00-11:00     Anna Gundert Uli Wagner - Quasirandomness and expansion for graphs

11:30-12:30     Anna Gundert Uli Wagner - Quasirandomness for hypergraphs

13:45- 14:45    Uli Wagner - Szemeredi's regularity lemma for dense graphs

15:00-16:00     Tamar Ziegler - Gowers uniformity norms

16:30-17:30     Anna Gundert Uli Wagner - Hypergraph regularity 
2017 Dec 24

Game Theory & Math Economics: Yonatan Aumann (Bar - Ilan) - "On Time Discounting, Impatience and Risk Aversion"

4:00pm to 4:30pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
Time discounting is a ubiquitous assumption in economic literature. We (re)explore the foundations of such time preferences. "Impatience" is defined as a preferences for experiencing the better states sooner rather than later, even when there is no uncertainty associated with the future. We show that, assuming consistency and some weak stationarity assumptions, impatience is incompatible with a meaningful notion of a risk-attitude (risk aversion/love/neutrality).On the other hand, if there is uncertainty associated with the future then discounting necessarily emerges.
2017 Dec 10

Game Theory & Math Economics: Sergiu Hart (HUJI)

4:00pm to 4:30pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
A unified integral approach to all the calibration results in the literature -- from regular probabilistic calibration to smooth deterministic calibration -- using simple "hairy" fixed point and minimax results.

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