# Events & Seminars

# Topology & Geometry Seminar: Serap Gurer (Galatasaray University), "(Co)homology theories on diffeological spaces".

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# Topology and Geometry Seminar: Alexander Caviedes Castro (Tel-Aviv University), "Symplectic capacities and Cayley graphs"

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# Combinatorics: Imre Leader (Cambridge) "Decomposing the Complete r-Graph"

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Title: Decomposing the Complete r-Graph

Abstract:

The Graham-Pollak theorem states that to decompose the complete graph K_n into complete bipartite subgraphs we need at least n−1 of them. What happens for hypergraphs? In other words, suppose that we wish to decompose the complete r-graph on n vertices into complete r-partite r-graphs; how many do we need?

In this talk we will report on recent progress on this problem.

This is joint work with Luka Milicevic and Ta Sheng Tan.

# Game theory & economics: Itzhak Gilboa (Tel Aviv, HEC Paris)

## Location:

Place: Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus

Time: Sunday, March 6, 2016 at 4:00 p.m.

Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m.

YOU ARE CORDIALLY INVITED

# Game theory & economics: Francis Bloch, Paris School of Economics

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Abstract:

# Game Theory & Math Economics: Ariel Rubinstein (TAU) - "Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies" (co-authored with Michael Richter)

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# Game Theory & Math Economics: Gaëtan FOURNIER (Paris-Sorbonne University) - "Efficiency of Equilibria in Hotelling Games" (joint with Marco Scarsini)

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# Game Theory & Math Economics: Itai Arieli (Technion) - "Social Learning and the Vanishing Value of Private Information"

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This paper considers a sequential social learning game with a general utility function, state and action space. We establish that the value of private information converges to zero almost surely in every Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of any sequential social learning game.We use this result to show that totally unbounded signals are necessary and sufficient for asymptotic learning to hold in every sequential social learning game. Finally, we assume that the utility function of each agent is a private random draw and establish robustness of our results. (Joint with M. Mueller-Frank). Read more about Game Theory & Math Economics: Itai Arieli (Technion) - "Social Learning and the Vanishing Value of Private Information"