2015 Dec 20

# Game theory & economics: Ariel Porat (Tel-Aviv University) - "Personalizing Negligence Law" (joint work with Omri Ben-Shahar)

4:00pm to 5:00pm

## Location:

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
2016 Jan 10

# Game Theory & Math Economics: Francis Bloch (Paris School of Economics) - "Dynamic assignment of objects to queuing agents"

4:00pm to 5:00pm

## Location:

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of objects which arrive sequentially to agents organized in a waiting list. Applications include the assignment of social housing and organs for transplants. We analyze the optimal design of probabilistic queuing disciplines, punishment schemes, the optimal timing of applications and information releases. We consider three efficiency criteria: the vector of values of agents in the queue, the probability of misallocation and the expected waste.
2016 May 08

# Game Theory & Math Economics: Matthew Elliott (Caltech) - "Endogenous Financial Networks: Efficient Modularity and Why Shareholders Prevent It" (joint work with Jonathon Hazell)

4:00pm to 5:00pm

## Location:

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Topic: Endogenous Financial Networks: Efficient Modularity and Why Shareholders Prevent It (joint work with Jonathon Hazell) We consider systemic risk in financial networks, by examining the conflict of interest between debt- and equity-holders. Through trading, banks can diversify their idiosyncratic risks and avoid failures following small shocks. However, the resulting interdependencies can cause multiple failures after large shocks.
2015 Nov 15

# Game Theory & Math Economics: Liad Blumrosen (HUJI) - "(Almost) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading" (joint work with Shahar Dobzinski)

3:30pm to 4:30pm

## Location:

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
We study the simplest form of two-sided markets: one seller, one buyer and a single item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We characterize the quality of the most efficient mechanisms that are budget balanced, and design simple and robust mechanisms with these properties. We also show how minimal use of statistical data can yield good results. Finally, we demonstrate how solutions for this simple bilateral-trade problem can be used as a "black-box" for constructing mechanisms in more general environments.
2016 May 29

# Game Theory & Math Economics: Eilon Solan (Tel Aviv University) - "Acceptable Strategy Profiles in Stochastic Games"

4:00pm to 5:00pm

## Location:

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
I will present a new solution concept for multiplayer stochastic games, namely, acceptable strategy profiles. For each player $$i$$ and state $$s$$ in a stochastic game, let $$w_i(s)$$ be a real number.
2015 Nov 29

# Game Theory & Math Economics: Ran Spiegler (Tel Aviv University and University College London) - "On the "Limited Feedback" Foundation of Boundedly Rational Expectations"

4:00pm to 5:00pm

## Location:

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
A common justification for boundedly rational expectations is that agents receive partial feedback about the equilibrium distribution. I formalize this idea in the context of the "Bayesian network" representation of boundedly rational expectations, presented in Spiegler (2015). According to this representation, the decision maker forms his beliefs as if he Öts a subjective causal model - captured by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) over the set of variables - to the objective distribution.
2015 Dec 27

# Game Theory & Math Economics: Eyal Winter (HUJI) - "Rule Rationality" (Joint work with Yuval Heller)

4:00pm to 5:00pm

## Location:

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one’s opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing first). Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m.
2018 Jan 29

# NT&AG: Shachar Carmeli (Weizmann Institute), "Higher Etale Obstructions for Quadratic Forms"

2:00pm to 3:00pm

## Location:

Room 70A, Ross Building, Jerusalem, Israel
2018 Jan 17

# Jerusalem Analysis Seminar - Avner Kiro (TAU) "On Taylor coefficients of smooth functions."

12:00pm to 1:00pm

2018 Jan 24

# Analysis Seminar: T. Umeda "Space-time estimates for strongly propagative systems: From Maxwell to Dirac equations"

12:00pm to 1:00pm

## Location:

Room 70, Ross building
2017 Dec 05

# T&G: Michael Farber (IIAS), Robot motion planning and Bredon equivariant cohomology

12:00pm to 1:30pm

## Location:

Room 70A, Ross Building, Jerusalem, Israel
I will describe a topological approach to the robot motion planning problem focusing mainly on the case of aspherical configuration spaces.
2018 Jan 29

# HD-Combinatorics Special day: Pseudo-randomness (organised by Uli Wagner)

10:00am to 5:00pm

## Location:

IIAS, Feldman Building, Givat Ram
10:00-11:00     Anna Gundert Uli Wagner - Quasirandomness and expansion for graphs

11:30-12:30     Anna Gundert Uli Wagner - Quasirandomness for hypergraphs

13:45- 14:45    Uli Wagner - Szemeredi's regularity lemma for dense graphs

15:00-16:00     Tamar Ziegler - Gowers uniformity norms

16:30-17:30     Anna Gundert Uli Wagner - Hypergraph regularity
2018 Feb 12

# HD-Combinatorics Special day: High Dim Random Walks (organised by Ron Rosenthal)

(All day)

## Location:

IIAS, Feldman Building, Givat Ram
2017 Dec 24

# Game Theory & Math Economics: Yonatan Aumann (Bar - Ilan) - "On Time Discounting, Impatience and Risk Aversion"

4:00pm to 4:30pm

## Location:

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
Time discounting is a ubiquitous assumption in economic literature. We (re)explore the foundations of such time preferences. "Impatience" is defined as a preferences for experiencing the better states sooner rather than later, even when there is no uncertainty associated with the future. We show that, assuming consistency and some weak stationarity assumptions, impatience is incompatible with a meaningful notion of a risk-attitude (risk aversion/love/neutrality).On the other hand, if there is uncertainty associated with the future then discounting necessarily emerges.
2017 Dec 10

# Game Theory & Math Economics: Sergiu Hart (HUJI)

4:00pm to 4:30pm

## Location:

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
A unified integral approach to all the calibration results in the literature -- from regular probabilistic calibration to smooth deterministic calibration -- using simple "hairy" fixed point and minimax results.