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2012 Nov 25

Game Theory & Math Economics: Sergiu Hart - "Too Much Two Good To Be True: The Complexity of Auctions"

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4:00pm to 6:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods (or items). In this talk we will focus on approximation results and on the "menu-size" as a measure of auction complexity which affects the revenue. * All the relevant concepts will be introduced in the talk.* The talk is mostly independent of the talk given earlier this year.

Paper 1
Paper 2

2012 Nov 11

Game Theory & Math Economics: Philip J. Reny (University of Chicago) - "Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions," (joint work with Roger Myerson)

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4:00pm to 6:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

Guided by several key examples, we formulate a definition of essential sequential equilibrium for multi-stage games with infinite type sets and infinite action sets, and we prove its general existence.

Paper

2012 Nov 04

Game Theory & Math Economics: Fuad Aleskerov (National Research University "Higher School of Economics" and Institute of Control Sciences, Moscow) - "Power Distribution: Theory and Applications"

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4:00pm to 6:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
We discuss a new class of indices taking into account agents'preferences to coalesce.An axiomatization of these indices are presented.These indices are used to evaluate power distribution in Russian parliament in new era and in Empire period, in the Reichstag of Weimar Republic, in IMF, in Russian banks.
2012 Oct 28

Game Theory & Math Economics: Sergui Hart - "Much Too Good To Be True: Lotteries and the Complexity of Auctions"

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4:00pm to 6:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

We consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single buyer. In this talk we will focus on the need for randomization (which arises only when there are multiple goods), and on the "menu-size" as a measure of auction complexity which affects the revenue. (All the relevant concepts will be introduced in the talk.)

2016 Jan 20

Topology & geometry, Matan Prasma (Radboud University), "Model-categorical cotangent complex formalism"

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11:00am to 12:45pm

Location: 

Ross building, Hebrew University (Seminar Room 70A)
Abstract: One of the first applications of model categories was Quillen homology. Building on the notion of Beck modules, one defines the cotangent complex of an associative or commutative (dg)-algebras as the derived functor of its abelianization. The latter is a module over the original algebra, and its homology groups are called the (Andre'-)Quillen homology. The caveat of this approach is that the cotangent complex is not defined as a functor on the category of all algebras.
2017 Jun 13

Topology and Geometry Seminar: Alexander Caviedes Castro (Tel-Aviv University), "Symplectic capacities and Cayley graphs"

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1:00pm to 1:50pm

Location: 

Ross 70A
Abstract: The Gromov non-squeezing theorem in symplectic geometry states that is not possible to embed symplectically a ball into a cylinder of smaller radius, although this can be done with a volume preserving embedding. Hence, the biggest radius of a ball that can be symplectically embedded into a symplectic manifold can be used as a way to measure the "symplectic size'' of the manifold. We call the square of this radius times the number \pi the Gromov width of the symplectic manifold. The Gromov width as a symplectic invariant is extended through the notion of "Symplectic Capacity".

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