2018
Oct
02

# The Einstein Institute International Undergraduate Workshop

Tue, 02/10/2018 (All day) to Thu, 11/10/2018 (All day)

## Location:

The Einstein Institute of Mathemtics, Jerusalem

Edmond J. Safra Campus The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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2018
Oct
02

Tue, 02/10/2018 (All day) to Thu, 11/10/2018 (All day)

The Einstein Institute of Mathemtics, Jerusalem

2018
Mar
18

2018
May
09

12:00pm to 1:00pm

Ross building, room 70

Title: On some heavy-tail phenomena occurring in large deviations

2018
Mar
21

2018
Sep
03

Mon, 03/09/2018 (All day) to Fri, 07/09/2018 (All day)

The Mathematical Institute, Oxford

2016
Jan
20

11:00am to 12:45pm

Ross building, Hebrew University (Seminar Room 70A)

Abstract: One of the first applications of model categories was Quillen homology. Building on the notion of Beck modules, one defines the cotangent complex of an associative or commutative (dg)-algebras as the derived functor of its abelianization. The latter is a module over the original algebra, and its homology groups are called the (Andre'-)Quillen homology. The caveat of this approach is that the cotangent complex is not defined as a functor on the category of all algebras.

2018
Mar
27

2017
May
09

11:00am to 12:00pm

Ross A70.

Abstract: In this talk, I will introduce diffeological spaces and some (co)homology theories on these spaces. I will also talk on Thom-Mather spaces and their (co)homology in the diffeological context.

2017
Jun
13

1:00pm to 1:50pm

Ross 70A

Abstract: The Gromov non-squeezing theorem in symplectic geometry states that is not possible to embed symplectically a ball into a cylinder of smaller radius, although this can be done with a volume preserving embedding. Hence, the biggest radius of a ball that can be symplectically embedded into a symplectic manifold can be used as a way to measure the "symplectic size'' of the manifold. We call the square of this radius times the number \pi the Gromov width of the symplectic manifold. The Gromov width as a symplectic invariant is extended through the notion of "Symplectic Capacity".

2018
Apr
16

11:00am to 12:30pm

IIAS, room 130, Feldman Building, Givat Ram

Speaker: Imre Leader, Cambridge

Title: Decomposing the Complete r-Graph

Abstract:

The Graham-Pollak theorem states that to decompose the complete graph K_n into complete bipartite subgraphs we need at least n−1 of them. What happens for hypergraphs? In other words, suppose that we wish to decompose the complete r-graph on n vertices into complete r-partite r-graphs; how many do we need?

In this talk we will report on recent progress on this problem.

This is joint work with Luka Milicevic and Ta Sheng Tan.

Title: Decomposing the Complete r-Graph

Abstract:

The Graham-Pollak theorem states that to decompose the complete graph K_n into complete bipartite subgraphs we need at least n−1 of them. What happens for hypergraphs? In other words, suppose that we wish to decompose the complete r-graph on n vertices into complete r-partite r-graphs; how many do we need?

In this talk we will report on recent progress on this problem.

This is joint work with Luka Milicevic and Ta Sheng Tan.

2016
Jan
03

3:30pm to 4:30pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus

Topic: Dynamic assignment of objects to queuing agents

Abstract:

Abstract:

2016
Feb
28

3:30pm to 4:30pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus

Topic: Weighted Utilitarianism, Edgeworth, and the Market (joint work with Rossella Argenziano)

Place: Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus

Time: Sunday, March 6, 2016 at 4:00 p.m.

Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m.

YOU ARE CORDIALLY INVITED

Place: Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus

Time: Sunday, March 6, 2016 at 4:00 p.m.

Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m.

YOU ARE CORDIALLY INVITED

2015
Jan
04

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

2015
Jan
11

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

We consider a Hotelling game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential customers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location. We show that when the number of retailers is large enough, the game admits a pure Nash equilibrium and we construct it. We then compare the equilibrium cost bore by the consumers with the cost that could be achieved if the retailers followed the dictate of a benevolent planner. We look at this efficiency of equilibrium asymptotically in the number of retailers.

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