Eventss

2017 Nov 21

T&G: Semyon Alesker (Tel Aviv University), Calabi type problem for Monge-Ampere equations on HKT manifolds

12:00pm to 1:30pm

Location: 

Room 70A, Ross Building, Jerusalem, Israel
Real and complex Monge-Ampere equations play a central role in several
branches of geometry and analysis. We introduce a quaternionic version
of a Monge-Ampere equation which is an analogue of the famous Calabi
problem in the complex case. It is a non-linear elliptic equation of second
order on so called HyperKahler with Torsion (HKT) manifolds (the latter
manifolds were introduced by physicists in 1990's). While in full generality
it is still unsolved, we will describe its solution in a special case and some
2015 Nov 15

Game theory & economics: Liad Blumrosen (HUJI), " (Almost) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading (joint work with Shahar Dobzinski)"

3:30pm to 4:30pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Speaker: Liad Blumrosen, HUJI
Topic: (Almost) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading (joint work with Shahar Dobzinski)
Place: Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Time: Sunday, November 15, 2015 at 4:00 p.m.
Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m.
YOU ARE CORDIALLY INVITED
2015 Nov 29

Game theory & economics: Ran Spiegler (Tel Aviv University and University College London), "On the "Limited Feedback" Foundation of Boundedly Rational Expectations"

3:30pm to 4:30pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
On the "Limited Feedback" Foundation of Boundedly Rational Expectations
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Location:
Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
Dates:
Sunday, November 29, 2015 - 16:00
Lecturers:
Ran Spiegler
Tel Aviv University and University College London
Abstract:
2015 Dec 27

Game theory & economics: Eyal Winter, HUJI

3:30pm to 4:30pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Topic: "Rule Rationality" (Joint work with Yuval Heller)
Abstract:
We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one’s opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments.
2016 Mar 20

Game theory & economics: Gilad Bavly and Ron Peretz, (Bar-Ilan)

3:30pm to 4:30pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Topic: Limits of Correlation with Bounded Complexity
Abstract:
Peretz (2013) showed that, perhaps surprisingly, players whose recall is bounded can correlate in a long repeated game against a player of greater recall capacity. We show that correlation is already impossible against an opponent whose recall capacity is only linearly larger. This result closes a gap in the characterisation of min-max levels, and hence also equilibrium payoffs, of repeated games with bounded recall.
2015 Nov 01

Game Theory & Math Economics: Abraham Neyman (HUJI) - "Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that obey the time-value of money principle: Characterization and robust optimization"

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
This paper characterizes the ordinal utilities over the bounded infinite streams of payoffs that satisfy the time-value of money principle and an additivity property, and those that in addition are impatient. Building on this characterization, the paper introduces the concept of optimization that is robust to small imprecision in the specification of the preference, and proves that the set of feasible streams of payoffs of a finite Markov Decision Process admits such a robust optimization.
2016 May 15

Game Theory & Math Economics: Talia Einhorn (Tel Aviv University & Ariel University) - "Israel's Legal Infrastructure – walking on thin ice"

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
A sound legal infrastructure is critical to the development of the Israeli economy. In its absence, business people and private persons alike face difficulties in planning their actions. All too often they are obliged to turn to the courts of law. However, in the absence of a proper infrastructure, those do not themselves have the necessary tools to resolve the disputes. The matters at issue are not marginal. They have long-lasting consequences for the economy. The number of publicly-traded companies listed in Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange sank from 657 in 2008 to 461 in March 2016.
2015 Nov 22

Game theory & economics: Sergiu Hart (HUJI), "Calibrated Forecasts, Leaks, and Game Equilibria (joint work with Dean P. Foster)"

3:30pm to 4:30pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Topic: Calibrated Forecasts, Leaks, and Game Equilibria (joint work with Dean P. Foster)
Place: Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Time: Sunday, November 22, 2015 at 4:00 p.m.
Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m.
YOU ARE CORDIALLY INVITED
2016 Jun 19

Game theory & economics: Jacob (Kobi) Glazer, (Tel Aviv)

3:30pm to 4:30pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Topic: Has the National Health Insurance Law Run its Course?
Place: Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond Safra Campus
Time: Sunday, June 19, 2016 at 4:00 p.m.
Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m.
YOU ARE CORDIALLY INVITED
Abstract:
The National Health Insurance Law is operated through several economic mechanisms that are meant to implement its vision.
In this lecture we will present the main flaws of some of these mechanisms and propose ways to fix them. The lecture will be in hebrew.
2018 Jan 29

NT&AG: Shachar Carmeli (Weizmann Institute), "Higher Etale Obstructions for Quadratic Forms"

2:00pm to 3:00pm

Location: 

Room 70A, Ross Building, Jerusalem, Israel
Higher Etale obstructions are cohomological obstructions introduced by Yonatan Harpaz and Tomer Schlank for solutions of algebraic equations over a field. Their definition is based on the theory of relative etale homotopy type. In my talk I will explain the construction of relative etale homotopy type and the resulting obstruction theory.
I will also present the calculation of these obstructions for quadratic equations of the form a_1x_1^2 + ... + a_nx_n^2 = 1. This is a joint work with Edo Arad and Tomer Schlank.

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