A common justification for boundedly rational expectations is that agents receive partial feedback about the equilibrium distribution. I formalize this idea in the context of the "Bayesian network" representation of boundedly rational expectations, presented in Spiegler (2015). According to this representation, the decision maker forms his beliefs as if he Öts a subjective causal model - captured by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) over the set of variables - to the objective distribution.

We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one’s opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing first). Refreshments available at 3:30 p.m.

Peretz (2013) showed that, perhaps surprisingly, players whose recall is bounded can correlate in a long repeated game against a player of greater recall capacity. We show that correlation is already impossible against an opponent whose recall capacity is only linearly larger. This result closes a gap in the characterisation of min-max levels, and hence also equilibrium payoffs, of repeated games with bounded recall.

This paper characterizes the ordinal utilities over the bounded infinite streams of payoffs that satisfy the time-value of money principle and an additivity property, and those that in addition are impatient. Building on this characterization, the paper introduces the concept of optimization that is robust to small imprecision in the specification of the preference, and proves that the set of feasible streams of payoffs of a finite Markov Decision Process admits such a robust optimization.

A sound legal infrastructure is critical to the development of the Israeli economy. In its absence, business people and private persons alike face difficulties in planning their actions. All too often they are obliged to turn to the courts of law. However, in the absence of a proper infrastructure, those do not themselves have the necessary tools to resolve the disputes. The matters at issue are not marginal. They have long-lasting consequences for the economy. The number of publicly-traded companies listed in Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange sank from 657 in 2008 to 461 in March 2016.

How good is a forecaster? Assume for concreteness that every day the forecaster issues a forecast of the type "the chance of rain tomorrow is 30%." A simple test one may conduct is to calculate the proportion of rainy days out of those days that the forecast was 30%, and compare it to 30%; and do the same for all other forecasts. A forecaster is said to be _calibrated_ if, in the long run, the differences between the actual proportions of rainy days and the forecasts are small—no matter what the weather really was.

The National Health Insurance Law is operated through several economic mechanisms that are meant to implement its vision. In this lecture we will present the main flaws of some of these mechanisms and propose ways to fix them. The lecture will be in hebrew.

I will describe a topological approach to the robot motion planning problem focusing mainly on the case of aspherical configuration spaces.

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10:00-11:00     Anna Gundert / Uli Wagner - Quasirandomness and expansion for graphs

11:30-12:30     Anna Gundert / Uli Wagner - Quasirandomness for hypergraphs

13:45- 14:45    Uli Wagner - Szemeredi's regularity lemma for dense graphs

15:00-16:00     Tamar Ziegler - Gowers uniformity norms

16:30-17:30     Anna Gundert / Uli Wagner - Hypergraph regularity