Eventss

2017 Nov 12

Game Theory & Math Economics: Chang Zhao (Tel-Aviv University) - "Optimal Dynamic Inspection" (joint work with Eilon Solan)

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus

We study a discounted repeated inspection game with two agents and one principal. Both agents may profit by violating certain rules, while the principal can inspect on at most one agent in each period, inflicting a punishment on an agent who is caught violating the rules. The goal of the principal is to minimize the discounted number of violations, and he has a Stackelberg leader advantage. We characterize the principal's optimal inspection strategy.

2017 Nov 19

Game Theory & Math Economics: Eilon Solan (Tel-Aviv University) - "Quitting Games and Linear Complementarity Problems" (joint work with Omri N. Solan)

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
We prove that every multiplayer quitting game admits a sunspot epsilon-equilibrium for every epsilon > 0, that is, an epsilon-equilibrium in an extended game in which the players observe a public signal at every stage. We also prove that if a certain matrix that is derived from the payoff s in the game is a Q-matrix in the sense of linear complementarity problems, then the game admits a Nash epsilon-equilibrium for every epsilon > 0.
2017 Nov 26

Game Theory & Math Economics: Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen (IST Austria) - "Computational Complexity of Evolutionary Games on Graphs"

4:00pm to 5:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
The talk will consider evolutionary games on graphs, which is a generalization of matrix games to graphs, using the solution concept of evolutionary stable strategies. In evolutionary games on graphs, there is a graph and a 2x2 matrix. Each node of the graph has a strategy of the matrix game - r or b - and initially all nodes are r. Then, a uniformly random node is made to follow b and the following is repeated until the graph is all one strategy again:1. Find the average payoff of each node when playing against their neighbors in the graph (depending on their current strategies).2.
2017 Dec 10

Game Theory & Math Economics: Simina Brânzei (HUJI) - "Universal Growth in Exchange Economies"

11:30am to 1:00pm

Location: 

Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
We show that a simple decentralized dynamic, where players update theirbids proportionally to how useful the investments were, leads to growth ofthe economy in the long term (whenever growth is possible) but also createsunbounded inequality, i.e. very rich and very poor players emerge. Weanalyze several other phenomena, such as how the relation of a player withothers influences its development and the Gini index of the system.Joint work with Ruta Mehta and Noam Nisan.

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